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Abstract 
This article focuses on the recent wave of M&A activity, both vertical and horizontal in TV 
broadcasting and distribution industries, and discusses the implications of M&A activity for 
competition, industrial and media policymaking. Moreover, it aspires to set a forward-looking 
perspective on the regulation of M&A in the TV industry. It is argued that while EU competition 
policy has difficulties to fully grasp anti-competitive effects resulting from vertical M&A activity in 
particular, industrial and media-specific policies dealing with the creation of an economically and 
culturally sustainable, European broadcasting and distribution sector are virtually absent from national 
and European policy agendas. It is particular in the latter two domains of policymaking that policy 
action is necessary. 
 
Highlights 
 M&A activity in TV broadcasting and distribution industries is heating up 
 Consolidation wave produces global powerhouses that control entire TV value chain 
 Competition policy has imposed behavioural and structural remedies 
 Industrial and media-specific policies are virtually absent from policy agendas 
 Call for a more integrated policy approach towards M&A in Tv markets 
 
Key words 
Mergers and acquisitions, TV broadcasting, distribution, business model, competition policy, 
industrial policy, media policy, regulation 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, merger and acquisition (M&A) activity in TV broadcasting and distribution has been 
heating up. Consolidation in these industries basically follows a cyclical pattern, with economic and 
regulatory conditions accelerating or slowing down M&A activity. In general, three major stages of 
industry consolidation can be identified. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 represented a seismic 
change in the American telecommunication landscape, creating a new regulatory environment that 
lifted cross-media ownership and fostered the convergence of broadcasters, phone companies and 
cable TV providers. In the wake of the Act, media, telecommunications and cable firms built strategic 
partnerships (e.g., AOL and Time Warner) helping them in vying for leadership in the dot.com 
marketplace. A second consolidation wave began in the US in 2004 and resulted in the four-major-
operator landscape controlling over 90% of the US distribution market (with Comcast, Time Warner 
Cable, Verizon and AT&T holding a firm grip on the market). The US industry is now entering into a 
further, and probably final, stage of industry consolidation, marked by the moves of industry leaders 
Comcast (acquiring Time Warner Cable) and AT&T (acquiring DirectTV). Today’s industry 
transformation is largely driven by the increasing rivalry from Internet and over-the-top (OTT) 
streaming platforms, which are threatening cable’s powerful gatekeeper position in the market. 
Whereas the US industry is already highly concentrated, the list of deal proposals seems to suggest 
that Europe is likely to lead the third wave of consolidation in broadcasting and distribution. As the 
European market is still fragmented with over hundred fixed and mobile operators and the European 
Commission is pushing for a single European telecommunications landscape, the expected, massive 
consolidation will result in a handful of European and, especially, non-European players controlling 
European infrastructure networks. 
Unsurprisingly, research into these matters closely reflects the speed of the subsequent 
consolidation waves in broadcasting and distribution. In the aftermath of the Telecommunications Act, 
many studies focused on the impact of the new regulation on the industry, and on the patterns of 
industry consolidation. Chan-Olmsted (1998) concluded that M&A activity in broadcasting and 
distribution heated up after the passage of the Act, and that cable TV providers opted for horizontal 
consolidation to prepare for the upcoming competition with telecommunications firms. Tseng and 
Litman (1998) analysed the merger between US West and Continental Cablevision, the first one after 
deregulation, and scrutinised the rationales behind the merger. They focused on the fact that not only 
large, but also smaller cable operators merge to become bigger, not only to compete with other cable 
operators, but also because of new entries from telephone, wireless or satellite. Competitive entry by 
satellite providers triggered off a new wave of M&A activity, with an increasing emphasis on vertical 
integration with content owners in order to differentiate from rivalling carriers. In the digital era, new 
players in distribution increase competitive rivalry, upgrading the importance of content (e.g., sports 
rights) as a differentiator. The growing ownership interest of cable operators in cable (sports) networks 
triggered off questions regarding discriminatory behaviour at both the upstream and downstream 
levels (e.g., Chen and Waterman, 2007; Lee and Kim, 2011; Singer and Sidak, 2007). Meanwhile, Jin 
(2013) concluded that de-convergence would become the most significant business trend in the 21
st
 
media century, with firms focusing on their core activities through de-consolidation. Vertical 
disintegration allows firms to split off business units that can be managed in a more flexible manner. 
The recent boost in M&A activity in broadcasting and distribution, however, suggests that horizontal 
and vertical mergers are more than ever strategically important in the international video landscape. 
This article focuses on the renewed M&A activity in (and between) broadcasting and distribution, 
and discusses the implications of M&A activity for competition, industrial and media policymaking. 
The renewal of M&A activity in broadcasting and distribution markets, and especially its acceleration 
across national markets, is producing global powerhouses that control the entire TV value chain and 
therefore enjoy significant market power. Moreover, vertical M&A deals are producing the blueprint 
for the media and communications industry for the next decades as it is often believed that the 
combination of infrastructure and content ownership is a critical lever for winning platform 
competition. Since policymakers are struggling how to deal with the impact of M&A activity in 
broadcasting and distribution, and to assess the impact of global behemoths in local TV ecosystems, 
this article questions the role for policymakers in this regulatory process. Furthermore, it aspires to set 
a forward-looking perspective on the regulation of M&A in the TV industry. On the basis of a 
literature study, drawing from communication sciences, media economics and law , this article 
sketches the effects of M&A activity and presents the implications of M&A activity for policymakers. 
First, a brief overview of recent M&A activity in broadcasting and distribution markets is presented. 
Second, the effects of M&A activity, both vertical and horizontal, on competition and diversity in TV 
markets is discussed. Third, remedies and recommendations for policymakers are outlined. We argue 
that while EU competition policy has difficulties to fully grasp anti-competitive effects resulting from 
vertical M&A activity in particular, industrial and media-specific policies dealing with the creation of 
an economically and culturally sustainable, European broadcasting and distribution sector are virtually 
absent from national and European policy agendas. It is particular in the latter two domains of 
policymaking that policy action is necessary. While some would claim policy action is premature, we 
argue that some intervention is necessary with an eye on securing fair competition, market entry from 
new players (of which hopefully some in ‘European hands’), and media pluralism.  
2. Recent and on-going M&A activity in broadcasting and distribution 
 
2.1 Challenging market conditions 
As mentioned, M&A activity in broadcasting and distribution has been heating up since 2011, largely 
due to the spectacular rise of online video and the arrival of OTT platforms. Although these 
developments might create opportunities for broadcasters and distributors alike, the anticipated shift 
towards streaming video may negatively impact on the level of TV advertising income and pay-TV 
subscription revenue. Although research shows that the impact of ‘cord-cutting’ (i.e. cutting pay-TV 
connections in order to change to low-cost video services) crucially depends on the level of network 
infrastructure, subscription tariffs and the attractiveness of the available OTT platforms, and that OTT 
tends to be a complement rather than a substitute to traditional sources of TV (e.g., Baccarne et al., 
2013; Fontaine and Noam, 2013), the industry is witnessing an increasing rate of pay-TV subscriber 
defections: roughly 1,4 million US households tuned out pay-TV in 2014 (Ramachandran, 2014). 
Moreover, a growing number of subscribers are cutting back on their programming tiers, signing up 
for smaller, cheaper bundles of TV channels, which provides evidence for the ‘cord shaving’ trend 
(Hagey and Ramachandran, 2014). Other studies highlight that, similar to their US counterparts, 
European pay-TV operators start facing a stagnation in subscription revenues and report a lower 
growth in EBITDA margins due to increased programming and infrastructure costs. A report from 
Digital TV Research (2014) forecasts that by 2020 European pay-TV operators will face a fall in pay-
TV revenues, and reveals that subscriber numbers will drop due to greater competition from digital 
video platforms. With nearly 90% of European households having access to digital TV platforms and a 
forecasted 99% by 2016, digital TV is approaching a saturation stage which leaves little room for 
expansion. Similar to cable TV providers, telecommunications operators are confronted with 
historically low ARPU (i.e. average revenue per user) levels weighted down by cut-throat price wars 
and regulations (e.g., on roaming tariffs) that further erode margins. Against this backdrop, M&A 
activity is considered an effective strategy to overcome these challenging market and regulatory 
conditions, and is helped by attractive stock valuations, availability of debt at low interest rates and the 
willingness of financial institutes to underwrite these high amounts of debt (Capgemini, 2014). 
2.2 Convergence between fixed and mobile distribution 
One structural driver underpinning the current consolidation wave is the accelerating convergence 
between fixed and mobile network distribution. Telecommunications and cable operators, both in 
Europe and the US, anticipate the spectacular shift towards mobile communications, and bet on 
offering quadruple play services (broadband Internet, TV, telephony and mobile services). This 
strategy, enabling customers to get all their household communications from a single service provider, 
lowers churn and reduces customer acquisition costs in the highly-competitive and volatile market for 
telecommunications services (Chan-Olmsted and Guo, 2011). The quest for a bundled 
communications offer, including mobile services, largely explains why fixed network operators have 
been going on a buying spree acquiring wireless service providers. Moreover, the steady stream of 
investments to secure high-capacity network infrastructure is driving fixed and mobile operators 
altogether. US telecom giant AT&T is expanding its mobile business, but its ambition to become the 
largest mobile operator in the US was thwarted when the Department of Justice prohibited the 
purchase of T-Mobile USA ($39 billion, in 2011). Its proposed $48.5 billion takeover deal for satellite 
provider DirecTV will allow the second-largest US mobile operator to become the biggest US pay-TV 
provider (Gryta and Ramachandran, 2014). Similarly, UK telecom incumbent BT has re-entered the 
mobile market after acquiring EE from Deutsche Telekom and Orange in a deal valued at £12.5 
billion. This offensive move by BT, which has become the main challenger in the pay-TV market, has 
induced competitors Sky and Virgin Media to look for partnerships with mobile operators and is 
definitely leading to a massive consolidation of the UK telecom industry (Raice and Bender, 2014). In 
contrast, world’s second-largest mobile operator Vodafone has a strategy of adding fixed network 
assets to its existing mobile footprint. The UK-based operator not only sold its 45% stake in Verizon 
Wireless to Verizon ($130 billion, in 2013), but heavily expanded its European footprint after 
swallowing German cable operator Kabel Deutschland (€7.7 billion, in 2013) and Spain’s largest cable 
company Ono (€7.2 billion, in 2013) (Henning and Vitorovich, 2013; Roman, 2013). 
 
2.3 Economies of scale, synergies and negotiation power 
Economies of scale are another structural driver for the next generation telecommunication and cable 
industries. They allow for operational efficiency and help in profitably rolling out network upgrades 
and improved services. Greater scale is a powerful answer to the inflated programming costs to secure 
sports rights and retransmission consent from TV broadcasters. According to SNL Kagan (2013) 
retransmission fees in the US grew from $215 million to $762 million between 2006 and 2009, and 
they are projected to exceed $6 billion in 2018. Pay-TV operators’ programming expenses (as a 
proportion of total revenues) have risen from 33.3% to 39.7% between 2004 and 2013, and are likely 
to further erode pay-TV operators’ margins. In this context, scale enables pay-TV operators to exert 
more negotiation power vis-à-vis broadcasters and content suppliers (Evens and Donders, 2013). 
Consolidation in the US cable market is taking excessive proportions with Comcast’s intended 
acquisition of Time Warner Cable ($45.2 billion, in 2014), AT&T’s bid for DirecTV and Charter’s 
purchase of Optimum West ($1.63 billion, in 2013) (Jannarone and Ramachandran, 2013; 
Ramachandran and Cimilluca, 2014). Also in Europe, consolidation is taking place at an ever faster 
pace. Since 2013, BSkyB completed its acquisition of Sky Germany and Sky Italy for £4.9 billion, 
while Liberty Global secured its position as the world’s leading cable operator after buying Virgin 
Media ($23.3 billion) and Dutch pay-TV operator Ziggo ($12.6 billion). Moreover, Liberty has been 
expanding vertically, purchasing shares in UK production company all3media, British free-to-air 
channel ITV and De Vijver Media, a Belgian production and free-to-air TV company. It has been 
unequivocal about its strategy of vertical integration with OTT, TV production and free-to-air TV. 
CEO Mike Fries, in an interview with the Wall Street Journal, said such a strategy is a means to 
overcome competition from Netflix-like players and to pay lower retransmission fees (Schechner and 
Zekaria, 2014). 
The above overview of the three main drivers of the on-going M&A activity may suggest that 
M&A is a purely rational process only depending on a business logic of creating more size and 
efficiency. However, such neoclassical perspective only gives a one-sided picture on M&A activity 
and overlooks the importance of corporate values and culture, cognition and leadership in strategic 
planning (Kung, 2008). Referring to the principal-agent theory, CEO’s not always pursue the 
company’s long-term interests since they ambition to maximise individual, short-term gain. Klein 
(2003) analysed the monumental merger between America Online (AOL) and Time Warner, 
completed in 2000, and concluded that the combination of disastrous culture clash, financial 
mismanagement, CEO hubris, greed and arrogance led to dramatic failure of the merger. In this 
context, the majority of all mergers – contrary to the claimed efficiencies beforehand the mergers – 
fails to produce any benefit for the shareholders and over the half even destroys value. Stahl and Voigt 
(2005) show that the overwhelming cause for failure is the people and cultural differences between the 
merging parties (over 30% of all cases), and that different corporate values are the biggest obstacle for 
media managers to overcome failure. Hence, M&A is not always the Holy Grail since efficiency gains 
are not automatically guaranteed. 
 
3. Theories of harm: effects of M&A activity in broadcasting and distribution 
 
3.1 Horizontal integration 
So far most mergers in broadcasting and distribution have been typical examples of a horizontal 
integration strategy, with firms acquiring or merging with other firms competing in the same part of 
the industry value chain (TV production, aggregation and/or distribution). The benefits of horizontal 
integration in broadcasting and distribution have been widely described in literature. First and 
foremost, horizontal integration helps distributors in building buyer power, enabling them to negotiate 
advantageous deals with broadcasters and other content suppliers. According to Crawford and 
Yurukoglu (2012), broadcasters and distributors meet bilaterally, and bargain à la Nash to determine 
whether to form a carriage agreement and agree upon the input costs (e.g., licensing, retransmission, 
etc.). In this context, M&A’s are a popular strategy to increase firm size and build bargaining power. 
Bargaining power vis-à-vis buyers and suppliers is a central component of competitive analysis, and 
should be seen in relation to other performance indicators such as possible entrants, possible 
substitutes and intensity of rivalry (Küng, 2008; Porter, 1996). Chipty and Snyder (1999) have 
empirically addressed the relationship between firm size and bargaining power, and found that large 
distributors are able to bargain lower prices in their negotiations with content suppliers. These results 
are in line with other studies and are not unique to cable distribution (Snyder, 1998; Tyagi, 2001). 
Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012), for example, found that large distributors such as Comcast have 
about 17% lower programming costs than small-sized distributors. Through experimental design, 
Ruffle (2013) identified, however, that subtle changes in the buyer-size distribution or the number of 
sellers in the market can create or negate large-buyer discounts. Furthermore, the benefits of horizontal 
integration can self-evidently also be explained in terms of economies of scale, allowing firms to 
minimise costs and increase margins. 
Horizontal integration strategies may, however, strengthen the market position of the merging firms 
and decrease the level of competition in the market, potentially to the detriment of consumers. While 
benefiting from network effects, powerful distributors can build pivotal power with regard to 
broadcasters. Adilov and Alexander (2006) show that the presence of large buyers may have a make-
or-break effect on a content supplier’s decision to produce, and creates gatekeeping, if not 
monopolistic, power with large distributors. If a distributor enjoys a (quasi-)monopoly position, 
broadcasters often have no outside option and little flexibility to close deals with alternative 
distribution platforms. The rise of the Internet may have broken the distribution bottleneck to a certain 
extent, but distributors controlling large portions of the market remain a crucial outlet for broadcasters 
to reach their audience, putting them in a skewed dependency relationship. This is especially the case 
in countries, which rely mainly on one to two modes of distribution for television consumption (Evens 
and Donders, 2013). Raskovich (2003) somehow nuances pivotal power and claims that large buyers 
not always benefit from firm size in a bargaining context. The reason is that pivotal buyers can no 
longer credibly abdicate responsibility for covering a supplier’s costs and often cross-subsidise 
consumption by smaller, non-pivotal buyers (as the latter’s payments do often not cover the supplier’s 
costs and the pivotal buyer needs to ensure further supply). Moreover, literature shows that 
horizontally integrated distributors may build excessive power and engage in monopoly pricing, which 
reduces consumer welfare (in terms of supply, diversity, pricing etc.). Several studies have examined 
price evolutions and found positive relationships between market concentration and price increase. 
The more competition in the market, the more consumer prices for TV services are disciplined (e.g., 
Goolsbee and Petrin, 2004; Karikari et al., 2003; Seo, 2008). Other studies assessed the impact on 
programming quality and content diversity. Inderst and Shaffer (2007), for example, show that 
suppliers will strategically choose to produce less differentiated products, which further reduces 
product variety, consumer surplus and welfare. Iosifidis (2014) notes that excessive concentration can 
endanger media pluralism (presence of different and independent voices) and diversity in the media 
(different political opinions and representations of culture). Diversity, also in the form of local, 
regional, national and supranational content, creates large choices for the audience thereby giving 
viewers greater freedom. On the contrary, Adilov et al. (2012) found that distributors with large 
bargaining power are more likely to provide programme packages that increase consumer welfare. 
Whereas small distributors favour à la carte programming, a monopolist with sufficient bargaining 
power bundle programming, which limits increases in programming prices and increases the 
subscribers base. They nevertheless conclude that asymmetries in bargaining power between 
broadcasters and distributors, and excessive market power because of dominant positions, should be of 
interest to antitrust and regulatory agencies. 
3.2 Vertical integration 
Two perspectives compete with respect to the effects of vertical integration in broadcasting and 
distribution markets. Integration can increase profits either by increasing operational efficiency or 
reducing competitive rivalry, among others through market foreclosure. Firstly, advocates of vertical 
integration claim that vertical mergers improve efficiency in bilateral contracting while reducing 
transaction costs, protecting brand names, and safeguarding intellectual property (Gershon, 2013). 
Additionally, vertical integration allows distributors to create synergies in terms of scale and scope 
economies, and easily share information with (affiliated) producers about viewer tastes and 
preferences (Waterman, 1993). Distributors collect valuable viewer information via online platforms 
and/or set-top boxes which they can monetise through innovative business models or new productions. 
Sharing such information might spur innovation in the form of new (thematic) channels, distribution 
platforms or advertising formats (Evens & Berte, 2014) – although it leads to discriminatory behaviour 
when only affiliated broadcasters have access to this information. Furthermore, vertical integration is 
said to eliminate the double marginalisation problem that gives rise to excessive retail pricing (if not 
regulated). Double marginalisation occurs when upstream and downstream firms each have pricing 
power and, taken together, set a double mark-up price. In this context, Evens (2014) suggests that a 
vertical integration strategy helps distributors in reducing transaction costs and, hence, tempering the 
level of retransmission fees paid to broadcasters. Research shows a significant efficiency gain from 
vertical mergers between broadcasters and distributors, resulting into increased programme diversity, 
higher subscriber penetration and price decrease between the merging firms (e.g., Ahn and Litman, 
1997; Ford and Jackson, 1997; Rogerson, 2013; Suzuki, 2006; Waterman and Weiss, 1996). 
 Figure 1: Foreclosure effects of vertical integration (Source: Evens, 2013: p.62) 
Secondly, vertical integration is said to create anticompetitive effects such as a raise in rival’s 
costs, entry-deterrence and, therefore, market foreclosure for alternative networks and distributors (see 
Figure 1). Vertical integration not only allows firms in a weaker negotiating position to defend against 
powerful players from adjacent stages in the value chain. It is often strategically used to create, or 
exploit, market power by raising entry barriers or allowing price discrimination across different 
customer segments and geographical markets (Rey and Tirole, 2007). Vertically integrated distributors 
can keep affiliated content exclusively on their platform or demand higher licensing fees for affiliated 
content to rivalling TV and/or OTT platforms. If the merging firms have market power on the 
upstream level, input foreclosure might arise. Hence, backward integration creates incentives for the 
merged entity to foreclosure its competitors in the downstream market. Merged firms can thus stop 
supplying rivalling distributors and deny complete access to the necessary input (Doganoglu and 
Wright, 2010). Conversely, customer foreclosure occurs when broadcasters have exclusive access to 
the platform of an affiliated distributor. Backward integration allows distributors to deny unaffiliated 
broadcasters access to their platforms and subscribers, and give carriage priority to affiliated channels. 
Research provides evidence that vertically integrated distributors are more likely to exclude rivalling 
networks and favour affiliated channels in terms of pricing and positioning (Chen and Waterman, 
2007; Hong et al., 2011; Waterman and Choi, 2011). Vertically integrated distributors could 
potentially raise a rival network’s cost and its vulnerability to competition by excluding or 
disadvantaging it (e.g., by charging for carriage). In both cases, limited distribution of channels may 
negatively impact the consumer choice and, hence, diversity and pluralism in the market. Furthermore, 
studies reveal that vertically integrated distributors are more likely to collude with other vertically 
integrated distributors to carry each other’s networks (Kang, 2005; Lee and Kim, 2011). However, the 
results do not imply that unaffiliated distributors automatically pay higher programming prices, nor are 
they systematically denied access to programming. 
4. Challenges for policymakers 
 
4.1 Competition policy 
The on-going consolidation wave produces national TV distribution markets that get increasingly 
controlled by a few telecommunications and cable operators, which might even operate on an 
international scale. Although there is still fragmentation across Europe with over hundred providers of 
TV services, the convergence between fixed and mobile networks is pushing distribution markets from 
a four-operator to three-operator structure (or less). Incumbent cable operators are nevertheless 
confronted with ever more inter-platform competition from terrestrial, satellite and/or IPTV providers, 
in addition to OTT services. A market with less players resulting from M&A activity does not 
automatically imply consumer welfare loss as it helps distributors to benefit from economies of scale 
and scope, and to find the money needed for network and programming investments. Especially in 
smaller TV markets, policymakers should ask themselves how new entrants and OTT start-ups (e.g.,  
now defunct Flemish WeePee TV and Bhaalu) can survive against much bigger rivals, and eventually 
approve mergers between smaller operators (e.g., number 3 or 4 in the market like German Tele 
Columbus or Dutch CanalDigitaal) to (re-)establish competitive balance in the market. Otherwise said, 
M&A activity enhances the intensity of competition in the market under certain conditions. 
Competition authorities, both at the national and European level, should, however, seek to promote 
or maintain market competition by regulating anti-competitive conduct by operators, not often those 
with significant market power. This might imply ex-ante measurements in addition to conventional ex-
post regulation. There might be situations where ex-post regulation is insufficient and, hence, ex-ante 
regulation is recommended. Additional rules (e.g., with regard to exclusive agreements, platform 
neutrality or gatekeeping positions) may deem necessary to shape the market, or behaviour of the 
merging parties, and complement the traditional ownership limitations. Moreover, competition 
authorities should ensure a level-playing field in a market that is increasingly marked by convergence, 
and populated by telecommunications, cable and online platforms. Telecommunications operators are 
in most cases highly regulated compared to their cable counterparts and especially OTT platforms 
(e.g., with regard to open access obligations). Regardless of the technical infrastructure on which they 
operate, operators performing in the same stage of the industry value chain should be regulated 
symmetrically. 
In contrast with gatekeeping positions resulting from horizontal M&As, regulators are less familiar 
with the growing trend towards vertical ownership structures. Although efficiency gains might 
produce a positive outcome, competition authorities should predominantly focus on the anti-
discriminatory behaviour of vertically integrated operators and the accumulation of power that comes 
with it. Especially when these operators have already significant market power in the production, 
aggregation or distribution stage and want to expand further along the industry value chain, rivals can 
be severely disadvantaged and fair competition could become at risk. Hence, regulators should be 
concerned about the accumulation of bargaining power residing with one gatekeeper and the effects of 
this pivotal power on rivalling broadcasters and distributors. Greater bargaining power often comes at 
the detriment of weaker parties in the industry value chain (i.e. independent producers and smaller 
broadcasters) and creates a zero-sum game with the powerful firm taking the lion share of the value 
created. Therefore, competition authorities should set rules that ensure a fair treatment of all business 
partners and prohibit discriminatory treatment between affiliated and independent undertakings. One 
of the possibilities is to impose accountancy or even functional and/or structural separation between 
the network infrastructure operator, service provider and content owner to prevent vertically integrated 
distributors from anti-competitive conduct.  
4.2 Industrial policy 
The 2008 global economic crisis and the on-going globalisation of the media industries have acted as a 
catalyst for renewed interest in industrial policy, through which governments actively shape markets 
so as to pursue ‘public interest’ objectives. Industrial policy includes government intervention at the 
supply side and aims at encouraging structural change (e.g., as part of a macro-economic agenda). In 
this context, merger control, as part of the competition policy framework, has been used, both to 
prevent and to promote, the creation of ‘national champions’. The idea behind such government 
intervention is that national champions acquire dominant positions in domestic markets so that they 
can achieve critical mass that is necessary to compete in the European internal market and the global 
marketplace. European member states have been relaxing merger control so as to facilitate mergers 
between national companies and allow a consolidation of strategic national industries including 
telecom and cable (e.g., Italian pay-TV operators Stream and Telepiù merging into a single satellite 
platform). In contrast, competition authorities have also applied these same antitrust rules to protect a 
hostile takeover of a national champion by a foreign (either European or non-European) competitor, 
which tends to suggest that the competition regulation has often been applied according to the 
economic and political interests at stake, and that industrial policy considerations may have been taken 
into account by competition authorities. 
The long-standing dominance of US-based corporations in the ICT industries, together with the rise 
of Asian tigers, has induced European policymakers to encourage ‘European champions’ to compete 
in the global digital market (including network infrastructure and OTT services). The evolution 
towards a worldwide industry, and the subsequent need for scale economies has triggered off the on-
going consolidation wave in the European broadcasting and distribution industries. The Digital 
Agenda proposes a major step forward in the creation of a single telecom market so that Europe can 
become a global digital leader, and the imperative of international competitiveness echoes the view 
towards M&As which prevails in Europe nowadays. The Digital Agenda is, at least at the rhetorical 
level, an example of how Europe is developing industrial policies to address market failure 
(fragmentation in the market due to limited scale) and claim back leadership in a global industry, but it 
needs to be brought into reality with all respect for the current competition policy framework. It makes 
no sense to abandon the existing cross-media ownership rules, and replace the current market structure 
by European telecommunications and cable giants, eventually vertically integrated with broadcasters 
and content suppliers, that hold a dominant position in European markets. Competition policies and 
industrial policies should therefore go hand in hand, since a champions policy not necessarily infringes 
merger control. Without merger control, champions would be able to collect monopoly rent – at the 
expense of European citizens – and would not be incentivized to effectively expand internationally. 
Instead of building European giants, governments should bet on combining merger policy with a 
macro-economic agenda that promotes research, innovation and knowledge sharing, stimulates 
entrepreneurship, incentivises investments,  provides adequate funding and enhances training and 
education facilities. 
4.3 Media policy 
The future of European media ownership in broadcasting and distribution is, however, more than a 
competition question as it also affects media pluralism, diversity and localness. Only recently, the 
European Commission has re-intensified discussions on media pluralism and transparency of 
ownership structures in particular, organizing a specific event on 3 October 2014 to discuss best 
practices in member states like Austria (#EUMT2014). Despite the importance of maintaining and 
preserving the media’s democratic function, it is fair to say though that the EU and also its member 
states have a complex and at times troubled relationship towards media pluralism. 
On the one hand, most will agree that the European understanding of media pluralism relates to a 
firm desire to limit government control over media, but extends to avoiding commercial interests 
becoming so overly dominant they can inhibit of free pluralistic exchange of media services as well 
and as effective as governments can. The entire public service media system, with public broadcasters 
being supposed independent from state and market, is exemplary of that vision. In that regard, Europe 
differs from the US, which has already since the beginning of the 19
th
 century adopted a rather 
libertarian approach to media, assuming a full and uncontrolled functioning of the market results in a 
‘free flow of ideas’. Several important policy documents such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union (article 11) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (article 
167) do entrust the Community not only with the possibility, but also with the responsibility to act in 
case media freedom and pluralism might be harmed. In this respect, cultural policy considerations 
(e.g., media pluralism) can be pursued by measures that are mainly devised to attain other EU policy 
goals (such as creating fair competition). On the other hand, however, translating the shared concerns 
about media freedom and pluralism into European policy practice has at times proven difficult given 
the European Commission’s dominant focus on the achievement of economic policy objectives and 
member states’ sensitivities regarding their ‘sovereign’ competencies in the cultural realm. Member 
states themselves also take less and less action in the field of M&A. Indeed, the Merger Regulation 
entrusts Member States with powers to review mergers with a Community dimension for reasons other 
than competition goals, among others when a proposed merger affects media plurality. Having said 
that, national competition authorities often lack the competencies to take more diverse policy 
considerations into account. Moreover, many member states have with an eye on industrial policy 
goals (see above) consistently relaxed ownership regulation and some (among others Belgium and 
Denmark) do not even have any media-specific ownership rules. This makes any meaningful 
intervention at the national level in case of M&A activity a challenging exercise.  
A combination of national and European measures should be explored in case we want to ensure 
media pluralism, and the importance of local content for identity as well as cultural diversity reasons. 
Firstly, while national media ownership rules have been relaxed over the last decades, policymakers 
should consider (re-)introducing European-wide ownership rules. Whereas the introduction of media 
pluralism rules at the European level turned out to be an impossible exercise in the past, it is clear that 
competition policy in itself is not sufficient to address some concerns in this area. Secondly, several 
countries (among others Belgium, France, Germany) are experimenting with a diversity of taxation 
measures on content carriers, assuming these should not only benefit from exploiting content services, 
but also contribute to the sustainable creation of local content. E.g., in France, new laws have been 
adopted, which oblige electronic communications players to contribute part of their profits to the 
funding of public service content (Donders and Lamensch, 2010). And in both the Dutch and French 
speaking part of Belgium distributors of content have to invest in local content production, be it 
directly or through a government-steered media fund (Donders and Evens, 2014). It is strongly 
recommendable to analyse how effective and efficient these instruments are and to consider, again, 
European-wide regulation. 
5. Discussion 
This article investigated the rationale of the renewed M&A wave in broadcasting and distribution 
industries, and discussed the implications for competition, industrial and media policymaking. 
Traditionally, EU policymakers have focused on merger control, as part of the competition policy 
framework, to assess M&A activity on the level of competition in a particular market, and imposed 
behavioural, and to a lesser extent structural, remedies to regulate anti-competitive conduct by 
dominant parties. In contrast, industrial and media-specific policies dealing with the creation of an 
economically and culturally sustainable broadcasting and distribution industry are virtually absent 
both from national and European policy agendas. With regard to competition policy, a more dynamic 
analysis of M&A activity in media and related markets is necessary. Whereas the European 
Commission has significant expertise in the area of horizontal mergers, assessments of vertical 
mergers do not sufficiently consider the adverse affects vertical integration might have on fair 
competition within the entire value chain and over-estimate the efficiencies resulting from M&A, or at 
least assume they exist. Moreover, competition policy and industrial policy go hand in hand. They 
eventually pursue complementary goals and should, hence, be considered more together. National, or 
European, champions can only gain competitive advantage with an effective merger control that seeks 
to promote fair competition in the market, and that prevents dominant parties from inefficient, 
monopoly rent-seeking behaviour. Similarly, policymakers have had a complex relationship towards 
media pluralism and ownership transparency in the past. The introduction of European-wide 
ownership rules, in combination with taxation instruments to favour locally-created programming, 
could therefore strengthen the role of the European content creation and distribution sectors in this 
global economy. These three areas of government intervention have always been dealt by like silos, 
and considered different and incompatible levels of governance. However, the complexity of the 
current global ecosystem and the drastic impact of the on-going M&A activity on local markets 
definitely call for a more integrated policy approach towards M&A activity in broadcasting and 
distribution. That does not mean we call for ‘instant’ regulation. However, we recognize the need to 
see these policy areas not as mutually exclusive, but as highly complementary. Cross-fertilization and 
mutual support between competition, industrial and media policymakers, all relying on more complete 
and layered assessments of M&A, therefore become necessary to preserve European broadcasting and 
distribution industries as economically and culturally sustainable, and to retain a leading position in 
the international video landscape. 
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